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French Front National voting: 
a micro and macro perspective
Marcel Lubbers and Peer Scheepers
Abstract
In this article we study Front National voting behaviour from a micro and
macro perspective, by taking into account individual and contextual charac-
teristics simultaneously. We test ve theories that offer explanations as to why
certain social categories, such as e.g. lowly educated people, people with a low
income or younger people, are more likely to vote for the Front National. An
unfavourable out-group attitude, an authoritarian attitude and a noncon-
formist attitude turn out to be unique for the Front National electorate,
whereas identication with France and political dissatisfaction can be found
among other electorates to the same extent. Between regions, large variance
exists in Front National support which is explained partly by the number of
immigrants present, but only indirectly by the unemployment level.
Keywords: Extreme right-wing voting; Front National; multilevel analysis.
Introduction
Already by 1991 an overview of previous research with respect to the
Front National electorate was available (Husbands 1991). This was only
seven years after the rst successes of the Front National, from which
may become clear that the steady rise of the Front National did not suffer
from lack of scientic attention. More important, Husbands’ overview
(1991) is rather interesting because of its severe criticism. He argued that
most research of the 1980s only asked where Front National voters lived
(with the danger of ecological fallacy), or asked who voted for the Front
National, without taking the why-question of this voting behaviour into
account. Furthermore, most research was essentially descriptive;
foremost bivariate cross-tabulations were presented.
Now, nearly a decade later, research on Front National voting behav-
iour has improved theoretically and descriptively. Especially research on
the longitudinal shifts in the Front National electorate brought to the
fore by Mayer (1998, 1999) has brought new insights into the eld.
Furthermore, researchers took into account the various theoretical
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approaches, and contributed to building a general theory on extreme
right-wing voting behaviour (Winkler 1996; Eatwell 1998; Mayer 1999;
Mudde 1999). Most of these theoretical assumptions are still merely
tested in a bivariate manner (Loch 1991; Hainsworth 1992; Lewis-Beck
and Mitchell 1993; Gardberg 1993; Perrineau 1995; Mayer 1996; 1997;
Mayer and Perrineau 1996; Ivaldi 1996; Martin 1996; Veugelers 1997),
leaving readers questioning the importance of the empirical relations
(Husbands 1991). In 1995, it was Kitschelt who published on the Front
National, using multivariate analyses. However, a major problem
remained unsolved; there were only thirty Front National voters in the
data upon which Kitschelt based his ndings. Recently, Mayer (1999) has
also taken up logistic regression in her important contribution ‘Ces
Français qui votent FN’. Mayer translated the various theoretical tra-
ditions on extreme right-wing voting into the funnel of causality.
Although we do not agree with all elements in the model,1 the basis that
social background characteristics inuence Front National voting via
social and political attitudes, and at the same time contextual character-
istics should be taken into account is crucial. This solid theoretical model
Mayer proposed to explain Front National voting behaviour has,
however, not been put integrally through the test.2
In this article we shall focus on the suggestions which Husbands had
already proposed in 1991, which are still not honoured, or at best, not com-
pletely honoured, and secondly, we shall build on the recent work of Mayer
(1999). First, we shall not only answer the question which social categories
were more likely to vote for the Front National before the party split in
1999 in a multivariate way, but we shall also test hypotheses on why these
social categories were more likely to do so. Next, we will perform multi-
level analysis such that we can also answer the question whether contex-
tual characteristics contribute to explaining extreme right-wing voting.
Integrating the ‘who’, ‘why’ and ‘where’ questions and testing on micro and
macro explanations simultaneously meets the theoretical “l’entonnoir de
causalité” (funnel of causality) that Mayer (1999, p. 205) proposes.
Additionally, an even more sophisticated way to look at the extreme
right-wing is to make a division between parties to such an extent that
we not only compare Front National voters with all voters for other
parties, but also to compare Front National voters with each and every
party electorate separately by performing multinomial logistic regres-
sion. In this manner, the extreme right-wing is not considered in iso-
lation, but in the arena of the multi-party political system (Kitschelt 1995;
Brug, Fennema and Tillie 2000).
Front National in the regions
The regional differences in Front National support are large: in the 1995
Presidential elections, not more than 4.6 per cent voted for Le Pen in
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the department of Corrèze (Limousin), whereas in the Bas-Rhin, in
which the European capital of Strassbourg is situated, 26 per cent
favoured Le Pen (see Figure 1).
Consequently, one of the main questions has been how these differ-
ences could be explained. Various characteristics of the regions have
been related to the support for Le Pen: the number of immigrants, the
criminality rate, abstainers of registered voters, the percentage of the
population living in urban municipalities, the unemployment level, etc.,
were all shown to be somehow related to the popularity of the Front
National (Husbands 1991; Martin 1996; Mayer 1999). Mayer, however,
pointed out meaningfully to the importance of composition effects;
differences between regions in the outcomes of voting behaviour may be
due to differences in the composition of the population. It is thus not
sufcient to relate regional characteristics to actual turnouts for the
Front National with simple correlations, because composition effects are
neglected methodologically (Mayer 1999; Snijders and Bosker 1999).
The statistical technique of multilevel modelling makes it possible to
analyse various contextual explanations of extreme right-wing voting
behaviour next to individual explanations.
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Figure 1 Proportion Le Pen voters in the 1995 Presidential Elections
Theories and hypotheses
Economic interests: contextual and individual hypotheses
The question as to why the unemployment level and the number of
ethnic minorities are important for extreme right-wing success may be
answered with Realistic Conict Theory. The underlying axiom is that
people are in competition over scarce resources, which may result in
intergroup conicts (Blalock 1967; Olzak and Nagel 1986; Olzak 1992).
The question then is, why do people compete along ethnic lines?
Tajfel and Turner (1979) showed that people who are considered to
be out-groups are more likely to be targets in conicts; people who are
perceived as different are easily accused of worse or worsened circum-
stances. Vice versa, people are not likely to blame the in-group, the
group to which they belong themselves. Extreme right-wing parties
emphasize this division between out-groups and in-group, and might
therefore be attractive in regions where competition over scarce
resources is more severe. As the unemployment level is an indicator of
the economic situation in a region (Olzak 1992), we expect that in
regions where the unemployment level is higher (1a) or where unem-
ployment increases strongly (1b), people are more likely to vote for the
Front National.
Also immigration may be source of competition. The larger the
presence of out-groups, the stronger competition could be perceived
from which exclusionistic reactions may eventually ow (Olzak 1992).
These reactions are dependent on the visibility of out-groups and the
extent to which they are perceived as different. We expect that: in regions
where the number of immigrants is higher (1c) or has increased strongly
(1d), people are more likely to vote for the Front National.
Research on extreme right-wing voting behaviour has not only focused
on regional characteristics, but, of course, on individual characteristics
too. Mayer (1997) argued the Front National in 1995 to be the rst
workers’ party, because no other party received so much support from
the manual workers. However, this statement was not tested in a multi-
variate equation. In 1999, Mayer indeed puts forward the importance of
the social background characteristics in the model of causality. Unfor-
tunately, occupational position is not taken into account in the logistic
regression Mayer performed (1999).3
On the basis of Realistic Conict Theory, we indeed expect that
manual workers are more likely to vote for the Front National, because
manual workers may perceive a stronger competitive threat from ethnic
minorities than other occupational categories, as immigrants foremost
operate in the same labour market segment as manual workers do
(Thave 2000).4 In turn, this perceived competitive threat leads to an
unfavourable attitude towards ethnic minorities, and, because it is
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exactly this sentiment upon which the Front National campaigns, the
party becomes a more attractive option to vote for. The same argument
of perceived ethnic threat and an unfavourable attitude towards ethnic
minorities may hold for lower-educated people, people with a low
income, and unemployed people. Thus, our hypotheses read that manual
workers (2a), unemployed people (2b), lower-educated people (2c), and
people with a low income (2d) are more likely to vote for the Front
National, as they have a more unfavourable attitude towards ethnic out-
groups.5
The social categories that are mentioned above are considered to be
worse off in terms of socio-economic circumstances. Following Realistic
Conict Theory, we may also derive that people who feel to be worse off
may react analogously (Mayer 1993, 1999; Winkler 1996). People who
experience a discrepancy between their actual and subjectively claimed
socio-economic position may perceive ethnic minorities as a competitive
threat as well, and therefore are more unfavourable towards ethnic
minorities and are more likely to vote for the Front National. The same
may hold for people who are afraid of losing their job. Therefore, we
derive that people who experience deprivation in the present situation (2e)
or expect deprivation in the future situation (2f) are more likely to vote
for the Front National, as they have a more unfavourable attitude towards
out-groups.
Theory of psychological interests
Another political attitude as to why people who are considered to be
worse off, or who feel that they are worse off, would be more likely to
vote for the Front National, is provided by the classic study on authori-
tarianism (Adorno et al., 1982). From an update of this theory, we derive
that living in bad socio-economic circumstances restricts the fullment of
desires, and leads therefore to repression of those desires (Scheepers,
Felling and Peters 1990). To handle the frustration which this repression
produces, people are more likely to submit themselves to a psychological
need, i.e. to submit to strong leaders or to strong traditional norms, as
well as to submit supposedly powerless and deviant people to themselves.
The Front National would meet this psychological need; Le Pen is claimed
to be an authority, and the programme of the party emphasizes traditional
family values as well as policies to the disadvantage of ethnic minorities
(Front National online, 1997). Now, Mayer (1997) argued that Front
National voters are even more characterized by their authoritarianism
than by their attitude towards immigrants. It is therefore interesting to
test whether authoritarianism is still a strong predictor in a multi-variate
analysis, and whether it contributes to explain why certain social cat-
egories are (expected to be) more likely to vote for the Front National.6
We therefore state that: manual workers (3a), unemployed people (3b),
124 Marcel Lubbers and Peer Scheepers
lowly educated people (3c), people with a low income (3d), as well as
people who experience deprivation in their present socio-economic situ-
ation (3e), or people who expect deprivation in their future socio-economic
situation (3f) are more likely to vote for the Front National, as they are
more likely to support authoritarian attitudes.
Social disintegration theory
The proposition of social disintegration theory, derived from classic
studies by Arendt (1951), Bendix (1952) and Kornhauser (1960), is that
those social categories that may be considered to be disintegrated, or
for that matter less integrated, are more likely to vote for extreme right-
wing parties, as these parties seem to offer substitute forms of inte-
gration, by ways of their nationalistic programme. However, in previous
studies on the German and Belgian extreme right-wing electorates this
aspect of disintegration theory was refuted, because disintegrated cat-
egories, e.g. non-religious people, did not turn out to be more nation-
alistic (Lubbers and Scheepers 2000; Lubbers, Scheepers and Billiet
2000).
The French situation seems to be somewhat different with respect to
the likelihood of non-religious people to vote for the extreme right-wing.
In The Netherlands, Germany and Belgium the non-religious were obvi-
ously over-represented among the extreme right-wing electorate (Billiet
and De Witte 1995; Eisinga et al. 1998; Lubbers and Scheepers 2000),
but not in France. We have to be careful, however, because the evidence
for France concerns merely bivariate relations (Mayer 1997). Where it
concerns religious practice, Mayer did not nd an effect either (1999).
Billiet (1995) argued that disintegrated categories are likely to develop
a form of nonconformism, because they are not integrated in inter-
mediary institutions that have norm-regulating inuences on everyday
life. Although the Front National emphasizes certain specic traditional
norms, especially with respect to the family (Front National online), the
essential point is that non-religious people and young people could be
more nonconformist and dare to oppose the status quo, in which the
Front National is strongly stigmatized by mainstream political parties
(Brug, Fennema and Tillie 2000). In France, nonconfomism may refer
to a rejection of widely and traditionally favoured values like solidarity
and equality. Rejection of these values, but possibly in favour of brother-
hood (i.e., fraternité), may explain why (supposedly) disintegrated cat-
egories are more likely to vote for the Front National. People who are
socially mobile may also be considered to be disintegrated from their
former social networks. From these considerations we deduce that: non-
religious people (4a), young people (4b) and people who are socially
mobile (4c) are more likely to vote for the Front National, as they are more
likely to be nonconformist.
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Protest voting
A widespread idea is that an extreme right-wing vote is based on dis-
satisfaction with politics, politicians, or the political system (Stouthuy-
sen 1993; Holsteyn and Mudde 1998). Protest voters are characterized
by their distrust in everything that refers to established politics. On the
other hand, these protest voters are supposed to reject ideological
stances that extreme right-wing parties promote (Kitschelt 1995), such
as an unfavourable attitude towards out-groups. Kitschelt takes the
argument one step further: he expects that if the protest voting expla-
nation holds, the electorate of extreme right-wing parties will not be
characterized by any of the socio-background characteristics.
However, already by 1942, Fromm had found that especially the
workers voted for the NSDAP out of protest, because they were dis-
satised with their own situation. Now again, we expect that people who
experience a deprived socio-economic situation, or people who expect to
be worse off in the future are more dissatised with pursued policies, as
they are more likely to blame the system for their misfortunes. Thus, our
concrete hypotheses state that: people who perceive a deprivation in their
present socio-economic situation (5a) or who expect deprivation in their
future socio-economic situation (5b) are more likely to vote for the Front
National, as they are more dissatised with the political system.
Kitschelt’s welfare state hypothesis
Kitschelt (1995) proposed that increasing international competition in
the labour market could serve an explanation as to why particularly
manual workers were found to be more likely to vote for extreme right-
wing parties. Manual workers, traditionally voting for social-democrat
parties, were supposed to consider redistributive governmental policies
no longer to be in their interests, and possibly may have come to favour
market liberal capitalism, traditionally proclaimed by conservative right-
wing parties. Nevertheless, Kitschelt argues that these voters prefer
extreme right-wing parties over traditional right-wing parties, because of
the racist and authoritarian stances that are less obviously present among
the latter parties.
Kitschelt tested his hypothesis by comparing right-wing voters to
voters for all other parties, and found indeed that a favourable attitude
on market liberalism positively effects extreme right-wing voting behav-
iour in France, Denmark, Austria, Italy and Norway. However, he did
not actually test whether manual workers who are in favour of market
liberalism are more likely to vote for the Front National rather than to
vote for the social-democratic party. Our hypothesis (6) states that:
manual workers who support market liberalism are more likely to vote
for the Front National versus the social-democratic party PS.
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Data and measurements
We make use of the French Post Presidential election data of 1995 con-
ducted by CEVIPOV (Centre d’Étude de la Vie Politique Française in
Paris) in seventy-six of the ninety-ve Départements. Because we
perform secondary analyses on data not primarily collected for the
purposes at hand, we have to resort to proxies for some measurements.
From the respondents we selected those who were allowed to vote.
7
The percentage of respondents (N = 3,891) who had voted for Le Pen
was 13.3, which is somewhat lower than the actual turnouts (15.2 per
cent).8 The descriptives of this dependent variable and of the social-
background characteristics are listed in Appendix 1 of which some need
additional information. Variables like education, income, job insecurity,
age and gender are not in need of further clarication. In this Appendix
1, also bivariate relations of the social background characteristics are
presented, to notify the reader of the similarities with previous research,
which has been based foremost on these bivariate results.
We have built a nominal measure for occupation, containing social 
categories that have been mentioned in the hypotheses. We decided to
keep the occupational category policemen and military employees as a
separate one in the analyses, because bivariate analysis shows a remark-
able strong support for the Front National within this category (25 per
cent). It is important to note that we took into account the present occu-
pational position, which is a necessary condition to test the hypotheses
on economic threat. Retired people are subsumed within the category
of ‘not working’ and not within the category of their former job. Also,
unemployed people are considered as a separate category.
To make a division between marginal and core Christians, we con-
structed the variable denomination out of three questions: ‘To which
denomination do you belong?’; ‘How often do you attend church?’; and,
‘Is there something after death?’ We transformed the answers to these
questions into three categories: core Christians,9 marginal Christians and
non-religious. Intergenerational mobility is constructed out of the com-
parison of the occupation of the father and that of the respondent.10
Four items measured the perceived socio-economic situation of the
respondent. They reected both the respondent’s situation and the per-
ceived situation of France in general, at present and in the future. A
factor analysis on the four items showed a clear two-dimensional struc-
ture: one referring to deprivation in the present-day situation and one to
the expected deprivation in the future situation.
Socio-political attitudes
The 1995 programme of the Front National opens with the slogan ‘Le
départ des immigrés du tiers monde’ (Front National online 1997). It is
especially upon this theme of immigration that extreme right-wing
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parties, all over Europe, build their prole. In the surveys the respon-
dents had to denote whether they agreed or disagreed with the state-
ment ‘There are too many immigrants in France’. No less than 74 per
cent agreed (completely). Two other items that measured the attitude
towards ethnic minorities correlated strongly with this immigration item.
These items refer to the opinion regarding freedom of Moslems to build
their own ‘churches’ (43.7 per cent (completely) disagree) and to the
feelings towards Islam (80.4 per cent (very) negative).11
Two items measured an authoritarian attitude; one that refers to the
opinion on the death penalty (authoritarian aggression), and the other
as to whether children should be taught to think critically or to obey law
and order (authoritarian submission). As a proxy for French identi-
cation, we used the questions whether one considers oneself to be French
or also to be European, and with the attitude towards Europe. Noncon-
formism was measured by the rejection of egalitarianism and solidarity.
As a proxy for market liberalism we used the attitude to prots and to
privatization. Finally, political dissatisfaction refers to the question
whether people are dissatised with democracy in France.12
Contextual characteristics
Numbers on present immigrants and unemployment of the Départe-
ments were received from INSEE (Institut Nationale Statistique et des
Études Économiques). For the year 1995, we only have a proxy of the
number of immigrants on the basis of the 1991 census, for which we
selected the foreigners with an Algerian, Moroccan, Tunisian, or Turkish
nationality (70 per cent of the foreigners from outside the EU). Unfor-
tunately, for 1995, we cannot produce a valid measurement which the
change in the percentage of immigrants expresses. This implies that we
cannot test hypothesis 1d. The number of immigrants with the selected
nationalities as a percentage of the total population varies at the level
of the Départements between 0.4 per cent and 11.7 per cent, whereas the
unemployment level varies between 6 per cent and 18 per cent.
Analyses
To test our hypotheses we employed multi-level analysis. With this tech-
nique, it is possible to estimate variance on the individual level and on
the regional level (Quillian 1995; Snijders and Bosker 1999), with the
benet that standard errors are more accurately computed. Because we
deal with a dichotomous dependent variable (voting for the Front
National versus another party), we test a logistic model for which the
binomial assumption holds. This means that the individual level variance
is restricted to 1.
Logistic regression analysis was developed precisely to deal with
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nominal variables. With logistic regression analysis it is estimated what
the likelihood is to vote for the Front National versus not to vote for the
Front National. A positive parameter b which is signicant at the a = .05
level denotes that the likelihood to vote for the Front National increases,
when one considers the independent variable. When b is negative, the
likelihood decreases. For the categorical independent variables (such as
occupation, sex and denomination) the parameter b can be interpreted
as the deviation in likelihood to vote for the Front National of a certain
category as compared to the average logit (Lammers, Pelzer and Hen-
drickx 1995). A positive parameter refers to an increase in the likelihood
to vote for the Front National as compared to the average logit and a
negative coefcient denotes a decreased likelihood to do so.13
To describe our results, we refer to Table 1. In this table the logistic
regression parameters from four models are presented. The null-model
states the percentage of Front National-voters, controlled for variation
over regions. In Model I only the social background characteristics are
taken into account to control for composition effects, whereas in Model
II also the contextual characteristics are added. Model III includes the
intermediary variables, i.e. the attitudes derived from the theories – out-
group attitude, authoritarianism, French identity, nonconformism,
market liberalism and political dissatisfaction – are added. If the effects
of the independent variables on voting for the Front National decrease
or disappear after controlling for the impact of the attitudes (Model III),
then we can conclude that the differences in the support for the attitudes
are partly or completely responsible for the effects of the independent
variables in Model II (Billiet 1995), which is in line with conventional
path-analysis (Davis 1985). When a social category appears to be more
likely to vote for the Front National, and this is explained in terms of the
attitudes, then the question is at stake which of the political attitudes is
relevant. Therefore, we perform additional multiple (linear) regression
analyses with these political attitudes as dependent variables to ascer-
tain whether and to what extent this motive is prevalent in this particu-
lar social category (Models IIIA to IIIE). On the other hand, when it
turns out that a certain social category is not more likely to vote for the
Front National, it makes no more sense to investigate which attitudes
they subscribe to.
Results of binomial analyses
Table 1 presents the results of the binomial analyses, which provides
evidence for the tests of our hypotheses.
In Model 0 we can nd the variance between the regions to the extent
people voted for the Front National. Because we already showed that
there are large differences between regions in voting for the Front
National, it is no surprise that the parameter at the bottom of Model 0
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is highly signicant ( V  = .29). Differences between regions could,
however, result from differences in the composition of the regional
populations. The introduction of the social background characteristics in
model I does not, however, support such a composition effect, as the
parameter even slightly increases to .32. In model II the contextual
characteristics are added. The interregional variance then falls to .17,
which implies that the contextual characteristics explain a part of the
variance, such as expected. But when we take into account the effects of
the contextual characteristics in the same model II, we nd that neither
the level of unemployment nor the rise in this level contributes directly
to the explanation, although the parameters are clearly in the expected
direction ( b  = .06 and b = .11, respectively), which refutes our hypoth-
eses 1a and 1b. We found the same results in The Netherlands and
Belgium and partly in Germany (Eisinga et al. 1998; Lubbers and
Scheepers 2000; Lubbers, Scheepers and Billiet 2000), and other
researchers also reported this nding (Knigge 1998). On the other hand,
the number of ethnic minorities ( b  = .40) contributes to explaining why
in certain regions the Front National is successful, implying that hypoth-
esis 1c is supported; the larger the number of ethnic minorities in a
region, the larger the likelihood to vote for the Front National.
Let us nd out now whether we can corroborate our other hypoth-
eses, in which we give explanations why certain social categories would
be over-represented among the Front National electorate. For this
purpose, we compare Model II, with all independent variables, to Model
III, which includes the political attitudes.
Although Mayer (1998; 1999) showed that manual workers, referred
to in hypotheses 2a and 3a, were overrepresented among the Front
National electorate, the results of multiple logistic regression in Model
II show that this is a spurious nding, especially due to related charac-
teristics like education and gender.14 This nding refutes hypothesis 2a.
Unemployed people are, however, also after appropriate controls more
likely to vote for the Front National, which we described in hypothesis
2b and 3b ( b  = .34). In case the attitudes have predictive power, this
parameter should approach zero or at least decrease in Model III.
Because exactly the opposite happens, namely an increase of the para-
meter to b  = .35 in Model III, the socio-political attitudes do not explain
why unemployed people are more likely to vote for the extreme right.
Unemployed people are not more unfavourable towards out-groups than
on average nor do they subscibe more than average to authoritarian atti-
tudes. This contradicts hypotheses 2b and 3b. Lower-white-collar
workers and police and military employees are also more likely to vote
for the Front National. Models IIIA to IIIE show that the likelihood of
the police and military is explained (foremost) by their authoritarian
attitude (b = .27). These models offer, however, no clues regarding the
lower-white-collar workers.
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People with the lowest education, referred to in hypotheses 2c and 3c,
are more likely to vote for the Front National ( b  = .26), such as was also
found by Mayer (1999). In Model III, when we control for the socio-
political attitudes, the parameter declines strongly, such as expected, and
even turns slightly negative ( b  = –.19). Because all attitudes contribute
to the explanation of voting for the Front National (Model III), Models
IIIA to IIIE indicate precisely which attitude is supported by the lower-
educated that makes them more prone to vote for the Front National.
We expected that lower educated people are more likely to vote for the
Front National, because of their unfavourable out-group attitude
(hypothesis 2c) and because of their authoritarian attitude (3c). In
Models IIIA and IIIC we nd that these hypotheses are corroborated;
lower-educated people do indeed hold a more unfavourable attitude
towards out-groups (b = .29) and are more likely to have an authori-
tarian attitude (b = .32). Moreover, they also subscribe more than
average to identication with France, are more nonconformist and are
more dissatised politically. The likelihood of the lowest-educated is
thus not only explained in terms of the attitudes we formulated hypoth-
eses on. In addition, the same explanations hold for the larger likelihood
of the secondary-lower-educated to vote for the Front National that we
found (Model II, b  = .22). They are more likely than on average to
support all the distinguished attitudes too.
A low income and deprivation in the present situation referred to in
hypotheses 2d and 2e, respectively, contribute to the explanation of Front
National voting behaviour, whereas the expected deprivation in the
future situation (hypothesis 2f) is not relevant. People with a lower
income identify more strongly with France and are more dissatised with
politics, but they are neither more unfavourable towards out-groups nor
more authoritarian, which refutes hypotheses 2d and 3d. The effect of
deprivation in the present situation ( b  = .24) is partly explained by the
addition of the socio- political attitudes in Model III. The parameter falls
to .14, but remains signicant. It turns out that the more deprivation one
experiences in the present, the more unfavourable one is towards out-
groups (Model IIIA, b = .06) and the more dissatised politically one is
(Model IIIE, b = .16). This is what we predicted in hypotheses 2e and 5a,
respectively. Hypothesis 3e is, however, refuted, because deprivation of
the present situation has no effect on an authoritarian attitude. Moreover,
people who experience deprivation in the present are also more likely to
identify with France (b = .08) and to be nonconformist (b = .04).
Next we proposed that non-religious people, young people and inter-
generationally mobile people are more likely to vote for the Front
National. However, the non-religious are not more likely to do so; on
the contrary: they are less likely to vote for the party ( b = –.26). It is the
category of the marginal Christians which is over-represented among the
Front National electorate ( b = .18). People between age 18 and 26 are
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indeed more likely to vote for the Front National ( b = .45). In Model III,
we nd that the effect is not interpreted in terms of the political attitudes
that are introduced to the model: the parameter even increases to .56.
We expected young people to be more nonconfomist, which is not the
case. They do, however, identify more strongly with France as compared
to the average (Model IIIB, b = .10). Finally, intergenerational mobile
people are not signicantly more likely to vote for the Front National,
although the parameter is in the expected direction ( b  = .08). Conse-
quently, we have to refute the hypotheses deduced from social disinte-
gration theory, in which we argue that nonconfomism could explain the
larger likelihood of the supposedly disintegrated categories to vote for
the Front National (hypotheses 4a to 4c).
We have already shown that the variance between the regions is
explained partly by the number of ethnic immigrants present. Surpris-
ingly, however, this variance is not explained by differences in attitudes
between the regions. The political attitudes included in Model III, do not
explain the variance between the Départements. This means that in
regions where the Front National has more support, people are not
necessarily more unfavourable towards out-groups.
Furthermore, the effects of the contextual characteristics on the socio-
political attitudes are quite interesting (at the bottom of Models IIIA to
IIIE), from which we can derive indirect effects of these characteristics
on Front National voting behaviour. There is, however, very little vari-
ation between the regions in the political attitudes. Nevertheless, there
is a small effect of the unemployment level in a region on the attitude
towards ethnic out-groups, on an authoritarian attitude and on French
identication. This implies that there is an indirect effect of the unem-
ployment level on voting for the Front National via these socio-political
attitudes. Surprisingly, the number of ethnic immigrants does not have
an effect on the attitudes, and this is not due to composition effects, such
as Mayer (1999) suggested, as we control for all relevant individual
characteristics.
Results of multinomial analyses
In addition to the results described above, more information is derived
from the data employing a multinomial approach. Mayer (1997) and
Mayer and Boy (1997) compared the electorate of the Front National to
the electorates of other parties too. Again, employing the multinomial
method increases the chance that previously ascertained relations turn
out to be spurious. In this analysis, Front National voters are compared
to the voters for the main competitors in the political arena; the voters
for the social-democrat PS (Jospin), the communists and Worker’s party
(Hue and Laguiller), the right-wing (Chirac and Balladur), the national-
ist French movement MPF (Villiers), and to non-voters.15
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The results of our analyses are contained in Appendix 2, in which only
the full model is presented. Because Front National voters are the refer-
ence category, the signs of the parameters are compared to binomial
logistic regression just in the opposite direction. Thus, in multinomial
logistic regression, a negative effect signies that the likelihood to vote
for the Front National increases for the concerned category and, conse-
quently, that the likelihood to vote for the party with which the Front
National is compared, decreases.
The multinomial approach is especially interesting where it concerns
Kitschelt’s hypothesis on manual workers who presumably have
switched from the PS to the Front National. In the binary logistic regres-
sion we found no signicant effect of manual workers on voting for the
Front National, which already cast doubt on the verication of Kitschelt’s
hypothesis. In the row of the manual workers in the full model of
Appendix 2, none of the effects is negative, which implies that the like-
lihood for manual workers to vote for the Front National does not
increase, everything else held constant, irrespectively of the electorate
with which it is contrasted. In contrast, we nd the traditional left-wing
and right-wing contrast; manual workers are especially likely to vote for
the socialist and communist candidates. However, Kitschelt (1995)
directs in his work special attention to support for market liberalism to
support his hypothesis.
Our analyses show that the more market liberal one’s orientation, the
more likely it is that one will vote for the Front National versus the
Socialist Party. It implies that for manual workers who are the more
inclined towards market liberalism, the likelihood of their vote for the
Front National versus the Socialist Party also increases. This would







Front National PS PC RPR/UDF MPF Nonvoters
Everything constant (averages of zero on z-scales)
Manual workers, not at all market liberal (–2SD)
Manual workers, very market liberal (+2SD)
Figure 2. Percentage of voters for the parties as a function of manual workers
and market liberalism, everything else held constant
suggest support for Kitschelt’s hypothesis. However, as is shown is
Figure 2, the likelihood to vote for the Front National when one is very
market liberal and manual worker is hardly larger than when everything
is held constant (which means no manual worker and average market
liberal). Although we have to support Kitschelt’s hypothesis, we may
cast doubt on its relative importance.
With respect to the other socio-political attitudes, we nd that an
unfavourable attitude towards out-groups, an authoritarian attitude and
a nonconformist attitude are rather unique for the Front National elec-
torate. The variables increase considerably the likelihood of a vote for
the Front National. Voters for the Villiers’ French Movement and voters
for the communists identify more strongly with France than Front
National voters ( b = .21 and b  = 13, respectively). Finally, non-voters are
not less dissatised politically than Front National voters. The likelihood
of abstaining from voting increases just as strongly as the likelihood of
voting for the Front National, when one is more dissatised politically
( b  = .03).
The contextual characterisitics are mostly in the same direction as we
found previously in the binomial analyses. Especially interesting are the
strong signicant effects of the percentage of immigrants. Compared to
all electorates, the Front National increases its support in regions where
relatively more immigrants are present.
Conclusions and discussion
In this article we have shown that by employing multilevel and multi-
variate analysis on voting behaviour, we have had to refute some previ-
ously developed hypotheses on ‘who are more likely to vote for the Front
National?’. This is most obvious with respect to manual workers. In a
bivariate analysis, manual workers have been shown to be over-
represented among the Front National electorate. We showed that this
nding is due to characteristics related to the manual workers; particu-
larly to their education and gender. The statement of Mayer that manual
workers are strongly present among the Front National electorate does
hold. But it is not because of a characteristic of manual workers that they
vote for the Front National, rather because manual workers are more
often men and because they are more likely than average to be lower-
educated. These ndings illustrate that appropriate controls are crucial.
To meet this condition, we tested hypotheses derived from ve differ-
ent theoretical approaches to explain extreme right-wing voting behav-
iour (Kitschelt 1995; Winkler 1996; Eatwell 1998; Mayer 1999), in which
we foremost focused on the link between the who and the why question
of voting for the Front National. With multilevel analysis we introduced
the macro- and micro-level of analysis (Eatwell 1998), and we tested the
‘l’entonnoir de causalité’ as described by Mayer (1999) integral.
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Moreover, multinomial analysis claried which characteristics are
unique for the Front National electorate, compared to specic other elec-
torates and non-voters.
Discussing the theories, we have to emphasize that all theories con-
tribute to explain extreme right-wing voting, but at the same time, not
all hypotheses derived from the theories are completely corroborated.
Table 2 summarizes which hyptheses are supported. With respect to the
theory of economic interests, we expected that those most strongly in
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Table 2. Overview of hypotheses on decisive (Contextual, Individual and Atti-
tudinal) characteristics of people voting for the Front National.
Number of Supported (+) 
Hypothesis or refuted (–)
Contextual characteristics
Regional unemployment 1a –
Regional increase in unemployment 1b –
Regional percentage of ethnic minorities 1c +
Individual characteristics
Manual workers 2a and 3a –
Unemployed people 2b and 3b +
Lower educated people 2c and 3c +
People with lower income 2d and 2d –
People presently experiencing deprivation 2e, 3e and 5a +
People expecting deprivation in the future 2f, 3f and 5b –
Non-religious people 4a –
Young people (18–26) 4b +
Socially mobile people 4c –
Attitudinal characteristics of people more
likely to vote for the Front National
Unemployed people
due to unfavourable attitude towards
out-groups 2b –
due to authoritarian attitude 3b –
Lower educated people
due to unfavourable attitude towards
out-groups 2c +
due to authoritarian attitude 3c +
People with lower income
due to unfavourable attitude towards
out-groups 2d –
due to authoritarian attitude 3d –
People presently experiencing deprivation
due to unfavourable attitude towards
out-groups 2 +
due to authoritarian attitude 3 –
due to political dissatisfaction 5a +
Young people
due to nonconformist attitude 4b –
competition over scarce resources to be most likely to vote for the Front
National. For the lower-educated this was supported, although the
mechanisms proposed in the other theories are valid for the lower-
educated too. For manual workers and self-employed people, the occu-
pational categories in which immigrants are most strongly
over-represented (Thave 2000), we do nd that they are more likely to
be unfavourable towards out-groups, but not that they are more likely
than average to vote for the Front National, after appropriate controls.
It is the category of routine manual workers, whose position has deteri-
orated as the unemployment level within this category is highest (Thave
2000), who are more likely to vote for the Front National. It is also within
this category that the number of immigrant workers has been on the
increase (28.9 per cent of the French; 25.1 per cent of the immigrants
work in this sector). The effect of deprivation in the present situation is
explained in terms of realistic conict theory too, whereas under other
economic worse conditions, people are more likely to vote for the Front
National, but not because they are more unfavourable towards out-
groups.
With respect to an authoritarian attitude as explanation for the over-
representation of a category, we may name especially the police and
military employees. Their support for an authoritarian attitude is strong.
We may assume that their longing for respect and obedience has driven
them into the arms of Le Pen.
Although previous research showed that nationalistic attitudes offer
no explanation as to why disintegrated categories are more likely to vote
for extreme right-wing parties, the French situation casts doubt on this
empirical regularity. It turned out that marginal Christians rather than
non-religious people, and people aged from 18 to 26 are more likely to
vote for the Front National. Moreover, and this is crucial, these cat-
egories are more likely to identify with France than the average in the
population. What is more, the alternative explanation that disintegrated
categories are more likely to wave aside French traditionally held
important values, and in this respect are nonconformist, does not hold
either for the young people or for the non-religious. It seems, however,
that it holds for marginal Christians. Despite this nding, it is important
to note that the effect of nonconfomism is rather strong, and contributes
signicantly, next to the other socio-political attitudes, in explaining
extreme right-wing voting behaviour.
Political dissatisfaction is for none of the social categories the sole
explanation why they are more likely to vote for the Front National.
Although the electorate of Le Pen is more dissatised with democracy
than all other electorates but the non-voters, for all social categories it
holds that political dissatisfaction goes hand in hand with support for
(one of) the ideological attitudes. Market liberalism is such an attitude
too. Multinomial analysis showed that Front National voters are indeed
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much more market oriented than voters for the SP, despite the dissoci-
ation from market liberalism in the party’s programme, which supports
Kitschelt’s hypothesis. Nevertheless, based on our ndings, manual
workers in favour of market liberalism are not more likely than voters
on average to vote for the Front National, which casts doubt on the
relevance of Kitschelt’s hypothesis.
Realistic conict theory predicted that high levels of unemployment
and high levels of immigrants explain extreme right-wing voting behav-
iour. We found, however, once more, no direct effect of unemployment,
which coincides with ndings in Flanders, The Netherlands, and
Germany. But, we did nd a small indirect effect such that higher unem-
ployment levels evoke a more unfavourable attitude towards ethnic out-
groups, a stronger identication with France and a stronger authoritarian
attitude, which in turn increase the likelihood of a vote for the Front
National. The number of ethnic immigrants does have a direct effect: the
more immigrants live in a region, the stronger the support for Le Pen.
This nding also resembles results from analyses in Flanders and The
Netherlands (Eisinga et al. 1998; Lubbers, Scheepers and Billiet 2000).
Mayer (1997, 1999) pointed meaningfully to the fact that in some
Départements where the number of ethnic immigrants is on average rela-
tively high, villages exist where this number almost equals zero. Breaking
down the regional level of analysis has sometimes led to different
outcomes. Unfortunately, when there is no control for compositional
effects, those ndings are not very valid.
Another point drawn attention to by Mayer (1999), and what we con-
rmed with our empirical analyses is that in regions with higher levels
of immigrants the level of out-group unfavourability is not higher,
although the people in these regions are more inclined to vote for the
Front National. The explanation Mayer (1999) gives for this paradox is
that a composition effect would disguise an effect of the number of immi-
grants on an unfavourable out-group attitude seems to be falsied, as we
took into account all considered important characteristics. The contact
hypothesis as has been suggested by Forbes seems not plausible either;
it does not explain why in regions with a high number of immigrants,
people are not more unfavourable towards immigrants whereas at the
same time they are more likely to vote for the Front National. This
nding, which seriously casts doubt on mechanisms behind the effects of
the contextual characteristics such as described in Realistic Conict
Theory, needs more attention. The lack of variance between regions in
the opinion towards out-groups may be caused by the national news
supply. People in regions with few immigrants may perceive the inux
of immigrants into France in general as much as a threat as people living
in regions with higher levels of immigrants. The translation into actual
voting behaviour for an anti-immigrant party such as the Front National,
may however be dependent on the actual presence of immigrants in the
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region, as saliency of the immigration issue (Togeby 1998) may vary
across regions. This idea may be addressed more thoroughly in future
research.
Concluding, we can state that the theories we proposed are all of
importance for explaining extreme right-wing voting behaviour. All
socio-political attitudes were shown to be of relevance in the French situ-
ation. It implies that we cannot leave out a ‘Baustein’, such as Winkler
(1996) refers to the various theories, in explaining Front National voting
behaviour and that we need the micro- as well as the macro-level simul-
taneously (Eatwell 1998) in building a general theory of extreme right-
wing voting behaviour.
Notes
1 Mayer takes into account party-closeness. Although it is interesting to nd out
differences between electorates to what extent the voters also feel close to the party voted
for, in a multivariate model it blows up the explained variance and raises more questions
than it answers. The question then turns from ‘Why do people vote for the Front National’
to ‘Why do people feel close to the Front National?’.
2 This is partly due to the progress Mayer (1999) made in her work. She decided to
take a time perspective into account, which implied a loss of comparable data which are
theoretically considered relevant. On the other hand, the model of causality Mayer
proposed is not tested systematically and integrally.
3 Mayer does not test whether unemployed people and manual workers are indeed
over-represented among the FN electorate. Mayer did construct a manual workers attach-
ment variable, based on one’s own, one’s partner’s and one’s father’s occupational position.
When all three had manual workers positions, respondents scored having three ties with
the manual workers’ class (which obviously is not a possible option for respondents without
a partner). Nevertheless, by ignoring a respondent’s actual occupation, Mayer did not test
her statement that manual workers are more likely to vote for the Front National.
4 Thave (2000) shows that next to the much higher unemployment rates of especially
Moroccans (35%) and Algerians (30%), immigrants are strongly over-represented among
manual workers; 44.1% of the immigrants are manual workers; for all working French
people this is 26.3%. For Algerians and Moroccans the numbers are even higher with
48.7% and 58.2%, respectively.
5 Next to a direct effect, one could formulate an indirect effect of unemployment on
extreme right-wing voting behaviour, because we expect that as unemployment increases,
the competetive threat from ethnic minorities increases, and consequently the likelihood
to have a more unfavourable attitude towards ethnic minorities. Although we shall not
explore such hypotheses in which an indirect effect of the contextual characteristics is
formulated, we shall test whether these indirect effects exist.
6 The difculty with authoritarian attitudes, however, is that it inuences the attitude
towards ethnic immigrants; the stronger support of authoritarian attitudes, the more
unfavourable one’s attitude towards ethnic minorities and immigrants, as has been shown
in a wide range of studies (Scheepers, Felling and Peters 1989).
7 People who were not allowed to vote (n=35) and people who are Jew or Moslim
were left out of the analyses. Respondents with a missing on the variable ‘for which
candidate have you voted at the elections’ (3.7 per cent) were not taken in the analyses
either. Non-voters are, however, taken into account.
8 The percentage of Le Pen voters in the descriptives (11.1 per cent) is lower, because
also non-voters are taken into account. In this article we shall label Le Pen voters as Front
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National voters, although at the Presidential elections voters choose for a person and not
for a party.
9 Only Catholics had to answer the question as to how often they attended Church.
Then, we made a distinction between core and marginal Catholics. To make such a distinc-
tion for Protestants too, we considered the variable ‘is there something after death?’. We
considered Core Christians to be Catholics who attend Church at least once a month and
believe in heaven after death, and Protestants who believe in heaven after death. We
considered Marginal Christians to be Catholics who attend Church less than once a month
and do not believe in heaven after death (but in either ‘something, but do not know what’,
in ‘nothing’ or in ‘reincarnation’), and Protestants who do not believe in heaven after
death. Finally, we considered non-religious people to be people without denomination and
who do not believe in heaven after death.
10 People who are in the same occupational group as their father are labelled ‘stable’.
The other respondents are labelled upward and downward, as long as they had no missing
on either their own or their father’s occupation. Because we had to deal with categories
of occupation, the measurement is a rather rough indication for intergenerational stability
and change. For theoretical reasons we combined upward and downward mobile people.
From an economic point of view, one would perhaps expect differences between the
upward and downward mobile people. However, in previous analyses we did not nd
signicant differences between the categories.
11 The three items were considered to measure the same latent concept, which was
supported by factor analysis results. Reliability tests showed a Cronbach’s of .69, which
we considered reasonable for three items.
12 All the political attitudes and the measurements referring to deprivation are trans-
formed to z-scores, with an average of zero and a standard deviation of one. The contex-
tual characteristics are transformed to z-zcores too.
13 The special way of dummication we used, accounts for the number of respondents
in each category, which is different from the normal deviation contrast. The parameter for
the reference category is deduced from the rule that all products of estimated parameters
and number of respondents in a category should sum up to zero.
14 More precisely, female manual workers (n=74) are even less likely to vote for the
Front National than the female do on average; 7 per cent versus 9 per cent, respectively.
Male manual workers are a little more likely to vote for the Front National than men on
average; 16 per cent and 14 per cent, respectively. Splitting out these numbers to the
various educational levels in the table below shows that being a manual worker becomes
irrelevant.
Gender Education % FN voters within % FN voters of 
category of all respondents
manual workers
Men Primary education 16 16
Secondary lower education 17 17
Secondary higher education 11 12
Higher education 0 7
Women Primary education 7 10
Secondary lower education 8 12
Secondary higher education 0 6
Higher education 0 5
15 The voters for Voynet (3.0 per cent) are left out of the analysis to restrict the number
of categories in multinomial analysis and to keep analyses reliable. Additional analyses in
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which another category was left out showed that voters for the Greens do differ rather
extremely from Front National voters, in almost all respects but age. Voters for Balladur
and Chirac do differ little from each other. In cases when they differ, the contrast with Front
National voters is in the same direction. The same holds for the voters for Hue and Laguiller.
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Appendix 1. Univariate distribution of selected variables of the Post Election
Survey 1995, CEVIPOF, and Front National support within these categories
(bivariate).
Candidate voted for in 1995 elections
Le Pen (FN) 11.1
Chirac (RPR) 19.0




Laguiler (Workers’ Party) /Hue (PC) 10.3
Blanc/ not voted 16.5
Occupation % FN vote
Manual workers 10.6 14.5
Self-Employed 6.9 15.2
Lower white collar workers 12.3 14.6
Higher white collar workers 10.4 9.8
Service class, executives, professionals 5.7 2.3
Police/Military employees .08 25.0
Unemployed 9.1 18.1
Not working for other reason 44.1 8.5
Education
Lower education 29.7 12.3
Lower secondary education 35.0 14.5
Higher secondary education 12.1 8.7
Higher education 24.5 6.0
Income
<10.000 Ffr 27.9 13.2
10.000–17.500 Ffr 41.9 12.7
>17.500 Ffr 24.2 6.6
no answer 6.1 9.3
Denomination
Catholic and Protestant: church attending and faith in life
after death 11.5 4.9
Marginal Christian: Catholic and Protestant, not church
attending and no or little faith in life after death 64.9 12.7










Upward/ downward 61.8 11.7




French Front National voting: a micro/macro perspective 147
Appendix 1. (continued) Distributions of the attitudes towards present and
future situation and of the intermediate variables.
Deprivation in present situation Improved Stayed the Worsened
same
Is your personal nancial situation
worse than before? 8.5 52.4 39.1
Is the economy of France worse
than before? 15.8 43.2 41.0
Deprivation in future situation Will Will not Will 
improve change worsen
How will your personal nancial
situation develop in the near future? 27.8 57.1 15.2
How will the economy of France
develop in the near future? 43.9 44.5 11.6
Out-group attitude completely disagree agree completely 
disagree agree
There are too many immigrants 10.8 14.4 33.0 41.8
in France
Moslems should be allowed to have 26.8 16.9 37.6 19.3
their own churches
Very Positive Negative Very 
positive negative
How do you think of the Islam? 2.3 17.3 41.7 38.7
Identication with France Both the same More to France Only to 
than Europe France
Do you have the sentiment of 29.3 28.9 41.8
belonging to France or to
Europe?
Very positive Positive Negative Very
negative
Attitude towards Europe 28.4 53.1 13.2 5.2
Authoritarian attitude Completely Disagree Agree Completely 
disagree agree
Death penalty should be 30.5 13.1 245 318
reintroduced
Think critically Discipline
What should the school 47.9 52.1
teach students?
Liberalism Very Positive Positive Negative Very
Negative
Attitude to prots 12.4 38.7 34.7 14.3
Attitude to privatization 9.8 45.2 32.9 12.1
Nonconformism Very Positive Positive Negative Very
Negative
Can you tell whether the 55.1 35.3 7.4 2.2
word Solidarity
(Solidarité) evokes for you
something: 
Can you tell whether the 48.9 35.4 12.3 3.5
word Equality (Egalité)
evokes for you something: 
Political dissatisfaction Very well Well regarding Not very Not well at 
most aspects well all
How does democracy
function in France? 5.7 49.4 36.2 8.6
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